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Designs; Harmonisation
ntroduction
Industrial design is a hybrid, it lies at the intersection of
art and utility. Design refers to aspects of pure and high
art, and design is also a feature of the most utilitarian of
objects. Design is therefore an essential component of
aspects of art and craft, and also of a wide range of
consumer and industrial products. In design policy, there
is a continuing tension between the desire to protect and
promote competition in the commercial arena, and the
desire to promote art, creativity and culture.
Industrial design laws are possibly the least
internationally harmonised of all of the intellectual
property regimes. At the international level, there remains
very real flexibility as to the requirements for design
protection, in contrast to other intellectual property
regimes, and legal regimes for the protection of designs
vary widely across jurisdictions. Different jurisdictions
protect designs through copyright, patents, sui generis
regimes and trade marks law, and many offer dual or
cumulative protection. This diversity in approaches to
protection is partly a reflection of divergent philosophies
of design protection, and partly a result of the real
practical difficulties for those devising systems of
protection. Design tends to occupy positions at the borders
ofthe major intellectual property regimes, with potential
for both overlaps and gaps in protection.
This article considers the issue of international
hannonisation of designs law. It first reviews the existing
models for and approaches to design protection, and the
existing international law requirements in relation to
designs law. It considers the arguments for and against
further harmonisation of designs law, and argues that, in
this area, diversity is to be preferred to harmonisation.
There is no evidence that there exists an optimal level or
model of design protection. It is argued that the absence
of highly prescriptive international agreements
harmonising the law of designs provides an unusual level
of freedom for each jurisdiction to craft a designs law
regime suited to its own social and economic conditions
and trade situation, and this is a real benefit to individual
states and to the international community.
Existing models of protection
There is no simple taxonomy for design protection.
Different regimes use different models ofprotection, and
each regime contains its own mix of choices from a
significant number of variables. Systems of protection
vary in:
Subject matter: what is protected, in
particular, which designs qualify for
protection, and which are excluded from
protection. Factors involved here are the
requirements of novelty and invention or
innovation threshold, required for
protection, and any exclusions, for example
on grounds of functionality, or the
relationship with other designs with which
the article must operate or interface.
2. Nature ofprotection: how it is protected,
in particular, the nature of the intellectual
property regime or regimes that apply,
whether artistic property or industrial
property, whether protection is automatic
or whether registration and/or other
formalities are required, whether protection
is through liability rules or through property
rules.
3. The term ofprotection provided, which may
itself be different for different types of
design.
4. The scope of protection provided, in
particular whether protection is against
copying only, or whether exclusive rights
also protect against independent creation,
whether there is a requirement ofconsumer
confusion or deception.
5. Exceptions and defences available, for
example what acts in relation to the design
are permitted by consumers, by direct
competitors, and by competitors in other
markets or aflermarkets, such as repairs and
supply of spare parts.
Almost every jurisdiction is different in the designs it
does or doesn't protect, the level of protection provided
to protected designs, and the particular mix of artistic
and/or industrial property regimes used to provide
protection and the requirements for each. Exceptions,
limitations and defences also vary widely.
Nevertheless, it is possible to identify a number of
models of design protection, at least in general terms.
Designs can be protected under a number ofregimes, and
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overlap between these regimes is possible. Models of
protection can be variants of copyright and patent
protection, and they can be legal hybrids. In addition, any
statutory regime is then subject to judicial interpretation,
and judges can be more or less influenced by a desire to
protect perceived natural rights in fruits of creation, or
by a desire to protect free competition. These underlying
judicial preferences can significantly influence the
implementation of any regime of intellectual property
protection.
The seven main models for protection which may
overlap are summarised as follows:
1. Copyright
Designs can be protected through copyright as artistic
works. A relatively low level of originality is required as
compared to industrial property systems. Protection is
then generally automatic on creation, with no registration
or formalities required, and protection arises immediately.
The copyright owner is protected against copying of the
design for the term of protection, but is not protected
against independent creation. The term of copyright
protection varies by jurisdiction and subject matter, but
it generally lasts longer than industrial property-style
protection.
Copyright protection has the advantage of being
immediate, not costly, requiring only a low level of
originality, and relatively long-lasting, it is therefore
particularly attractive to industries in which products have
a short effective life in the market, and for use for
products that are not highly original and that are not
especially high value. Examples are fashion, textiles,
furnishings and the toy industry. Generally artistic
copyright is intended to protect the artistic features of
industrial design, rather then the functional features, and
it may not be well-suited to designs that are entirely
functional, such as parts of industrial machinery. For these
functional designs, the value to consumers of allowing
competition in making the designed article can be seen
to outweigh any public interest in providing design
protection. Manyjurisdictions exclude entirely functional
works, or works ofmixed artistic and functional content,
from copyright protection, and this is achieved by a
variety of mechanisms. The inevitable difficulty is in
designing a system for excluding functional designs that
clearly distinguishes protectable from unprotectable
designs, and that is consistent with underlying policy.
Exceptions and limitations to copyright and defences
to infringement vary widely across jurisdictions. Where
copyright protection is available for industrial designs,
exceptions can be crafted allowing some otherwise
infringing acts by consumers or competitors. Spare parts
exceptions are the most notable of these exceptions. It is
also common for the term of copyright to be limited for
industrial designs, in the interests of allowing competition
at the end of a shorter period than is available for "pure"
artistic works, which typically receive life of the author
plus 50 or 70 years.
There are disadvantages to copyright protection for
designs. For the author/creator, it is necessary to prove
copying in order to establish infringement, and to establish
that more than just ideas have been copied. For
competitors and second-corners, copyright protection
creates uncertainty.2 The absence of a registration system
means that there is no public registry that can be searched
to identify prior art and to identify the owners of that art.
The low originality threshold means that artistic works
that are entirely functional can still be protected, unless
explicitly excluded. For works with a low level of
originality, copyright protection is thin, and courts
generally require a high degree of similarity, ifnot slavish
copying, before they will find that the work is infringed?
Where a court considers that a work has a higher level of
originality, it is more likely that the work will be found
to be copied by a similar work, so that follow-on
innovators are more restricted in this situation. In
copyright, the scope ofprotection is not clearly identified
as it would be in a design specification, so that it is not
clear which features can and can't be imitated-that is,
which features are unprotected ideas, and which features
constitute expression of those ideas. The outcome of
copyright litigation, especially in so-called "altered
copying" cases4 can be difficult to predict, and this
uncertainty can in itself have a chilling effect on
second-corner innovation.
2. Patentlutility model/petty patent
protection
Patent law is an industrial property regime, which is
designed to protect inventions from both copying and
independent creation. Designs can be protected through
patent law, so long as the design meets the requirements
ofnovelty, inventiveness, utility and related requirements.
Generally this protection is not suitable for purely
ornamental designs, but it can be applicable to functional
designs. The required threshold ofinnovation is high, and
registration and examination is required. However, once
achieved, protection is relatively strong, and operates to
protect against copying and independent creation for the
term of protection. Patent protection is best suited to
high-value products with an expected lengthy life-cycle
in the market, justifying the expense of registration and
the delays in obtaining protection. Many countries offer
patent protection for designs in some form, but it will
only ever be a minority of designs that are protectable in
this way, so that generally another form ofprotection will
also be required for ornamental designs and designs that
are not sufficiently innovative to meet the rigorous patent
requirements.
2 See discussion in UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development, 2005 346-347.
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Patent law therefore protects a minority of designs,
protecting only those that are novel and non-obvious. But
patent law provides a very high level ofprotection to this
small number of designs. It is arguable that patent law
over-protects designs, preventing second corners from
using those designs in subsequent innovation without first
negotiating a license, which may or may not be
forthcoming. For designs that are not high-value, the
transaction costs involved in obtaining licences may
exceed the benefit obtained from using the innovation.
In these circumstances, patents for designs may take too
much from the public domain and potentially chill further
innovation, so that there is no net public benefit in
providing patent protection.
3. Registered design protection
Sui generis registered design protection generally refers
to an industrial property regime, whereby a new design
applied to an article is protected through a system which
requires registration of the design and payment of fees.
Registered designs are then protected for the duration of
their term against any infringing use of the design; there
is no need to prove copying.
Registered design protection on an industrial property
model has significant advantages, most of which result
from the requirement for registration. Once registered,
the owner of the design has a well-defined right to use
and license the design, and to prevent others from using
the design. There is no need to prove copying. The fact
of registration gives notice to competitors and second
corners. Competitors can identify the design as prior art,
they can identify the features that are protected and the
scope of the monopoly, and they can identify the owner
of the design. However, design registration requires a
higher innovation threshold than copyright. Registration
is also costly, and involves inevitable delays, so that it is
not well-suited to low-value products or products with
short life-cycles. Design registration also requires
disclosure, which can lead to copying. Sui generis
protection is not therefore universally popular. It is also,
like other industrial property regimes, an expensive
system for a state to administer, and this is not a trivial
consideration, especially for developing countries and
countries that are net importers of technology.
4. Unregistered design right protection
Unregistered design rights share features of both
registered design protection and copyright protection.
Like copyright, no formalities are required, and copying
is generally an ingredient of infringement.5 The term of
protection is generally shorter than for copyright,
commonly three to five years only. Unregistered design
protection is therefore suited to items for which protection
is desired immediately, and which are expected to have
a short life in the market.
5. Trade mark law
Aspects of design can also be protected through trade
mark law, either by registered trade mark or for
unregistered trade marks through the use of passing off,
unfair competition or trade practices law. Features of
shape and configuration of a design, or trade dress, can
be protected to the extent that they carry a secondary or
trade mark meaning. Commonly, infringement will
require establishing consumer confusion or dilution of
the mark.
Trade mark protection will offer useful protection for
some designs in some trade contexts, but it will not offer
a comprehensive system of protection for all designs. It
is not suited to designs whose primary purpose is artistic.
However, it does have some advantages. Much industrial
design is actually for the purpose of advertising or
branding, and design variations are often created primarily
for product differentiation purposes, in order to soften
price competition.6 It is arguable that designs in this
context are actually being used for a trade mark purpose,
and trade mark law is the most appropriate means by
which they should be protected. Trade mark law is
designed to protect indicators of source, ands to reduce
consumer search costs. Protection generally requires
distinctiveness, use, and the absence of consumer
confusion or likely confusion. These are important checks
that are intended to avoid over-protection of actual
products, at the expense of competition and therefore of
consumers. Where designs are used in a trade mark sense,
then it is arguable that trade mark law is the most
appropriate means by which they should be protected, if
at all.
6. Cumulation/partial cumulation
Designs can be protected through a combination of
regimes, so that the same design may receive
simultaneous protection from more than one regime. Most
commonly, designs may be protected by copyright and
also through an industrial property regime. For example,
France operates a cumulation regime which allows for
copyright protection of works of applied art under the
"unity of art" doctrine. Partial cumulation allows for
copyright protection for at least some categories ofworks
of applied art, in addition to designs protection, such as
in German law.7 The detail ofhow and the extent to which
cumulation or partial cumulation is achieved can vary
across jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions offer strong
copyright protection, and the protection provided by
industrial property is consequently restricted or not
discussion in Martin Howe, Russell-Clarke and Howe on Industrial Designs, 7th edn London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2005, pp.3-7.6See discussion in Australian Law Reform Commission Designs, Report No.74 1995 [3.19]. See also Bureau of Industrial Economics, The Economics ofIntellectualProperty Rightsfor Designs 1995.
7See discussion in Sam Ricketson and Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and Beyond, 2nd edn Oxford; NewYork: Oxford University Press, 2006, Vol.1, pp.467-469.
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heavily used. Otherjurisdictions rely heavily in industrial
property protection and restrict copyright protection.
Other jurisdictions offer very generous cumulative
protection.
"Optima" design protection?
There is little empirical evidence on which to base an
argument that there is a model for the legal protection of
designs which could be described as optimal. It is of
course possible to compare different regimes in different
jurisdictions, but impossible to control for all of the
factors which influence design activity and innovation.
The concept that there exists a single solution to
designs protection that would be optimal across all
jurisdictions is itself highly challengeable. What
constitutes an appropriate designs regime will vary
considerably across jurisdictions, depending on factors
including level of development, indigenous design
requirements, competition and tax regimes, and trade
policy.
I. Designs protection in international law
At the intemational law level, multilateral intellectual
property agreements impose some requirements on
signatories in relation to industrial design protection, but
some flexibility remains as to how industrial design
protection is to be achieved. Historically, the law has been
slow to extend intellectual property protection to industrial
design. Internationally, design protection is still something
of a poor relation of other forms of intellectual property
protection. Today, the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works Berne
Convention8 does contain important provisions on
designs law, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights TRIPS Agreement also
requires compliance with relevant provisions ofthe Berne
Convention.9 However, design protection is not always
coherent and certainly not standardised across
jurisdictions, and this reflects the history of designs law
and the widely differing philosophies underlying it.
In the first half of the 20th century, European
jurisdictions adopted widely differing philosophical
approaches to protecting industrial design, and quite
different legal frameworks.'° France, particularly,
promoted a "unity ofart" approach that did not distinguish
pure from applied art in allocating protection. French law
offered dual protection under both copyright and sui
generis designs regimes.' Other European jurisdictions
took different approaches. Italy excluded ornamental
designs from copyright protection, and Germany
providing copyright protection for only a limited number
of exceptional designs, but both countries provided sui
generis protection. 12
In English law, the first efforts to protect designs began
with textiles, for which a registration system was
established in 1787, giving an exclusive right to print the
design for two months from date of first publication.3
These rights in textiles were gradually expanded, and
expanded beyond textiles, by a number of copyright and
design statutes providing for copyright in designs
expanding the range ofregistrable designs.'4 By the 20th
century, industrial designs law provided for 15-year
protection for registered designs, and copyright law
protected artistic works for the term of copyright.15
There was, therefore, more diversity in industrial design
law than in copyright or patent law during this period,
despite multilateral treaty-making aimed at achieving
consistency in intellectual property law across Europe.
Historically, negotiation of international agreements has
taken place against this background of considerable
diversity of approach, and the resulting texts are therefore
less prescriptive than they are in other areas of intellectual
property law.
Berne Convention
The parties to the Berne Convention were slow to extend
protection to works of applied art, and such works only
received protection against considerable opposition.'6 The
1948 revision ofthe Berne Convention was a compromise,
under which "works of applied art" were added to the list
of protected subject-matter, but with provisions for
limiting the duration of protection, and with provisions
for states to distinguish between applied art and "designs
and models".'7
This compromise largely remains in the current version
of the Berne Convention, which explicitly requires
protection for authors of literary and artistic works.'8 The
term "literary and artistic works" includes'9:
". . . every production in the literary, scientific and
artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form
ofits expression, such as books, pamphlets and other
writings; lectures, addresses, sermons and other
works of the same nature; dramatic or
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1994 art.9 1.
See discussion in J.H. Reichman, "Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law: From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976" 1983
DukeL.J. 1143, 1153-1163.
1Reichman, "Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law" 1983 Duke L.J. 1143, 1157-1158.
Reichman, "Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law" 1983 Duke L.J. 1143, 1161
and Printing of Linens Act 1787. This legislation initially provided for an exclusive right for two months from the date of first publication.
See Brad Sherman and Lionel Bently, The Making of Modem Intellectual Property Law: the British Experience Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999,
l760-l9ll.
discussion in Howe, Russell-Clarke and Howe on Industrial Designs, 7th edn London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2005, pp.7-22.
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Reichman, "Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law" 1983 Duke L.J. 1143, 1161-1163. See also detailed discussion in Sam Ricketson and Jane C.
Ginsburg, International C'opyright andNeighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention andBeyond, 2nd edn Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, vol 1, pp.453-469.
Beme Convention arts 2 and 9.
`9Beme Convention art.2l.
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dramatico-musical works; choreographic works and
entertainments in dumb show; musical compositions
with or without words; cinematographic works to
which are assimilated works expressed by a process
analogous to cinematography; works of drawing,
painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving and
lithography; photographic works to which are
assimilated works expressed by a process analogous
to photography; works ofapplied art; illustrations,
maps, plans, sketches and three-dimensional works
relative to geography, topography, architecture or
science"emphasis added.
Works of applied art are therefore specifically included.
However there is no definition of "works of applied art".
Article 27 of the Berne Convention is also significant
here. Article 27 provides:
"7 Subject to the provisions of Article 74 of this
Convention, it shall be a matter for legislation in the
countries ofthe Union to determine the extent ofthe
application of their laws to works of applied art and
industrial designs and models, as well as the
conditions under which such works, designs and
models shall be protected. Works protected in the
country of origin solely as designs and models shall
be entitled in another country of the Union only to
such special protection as is granted in that country
to designs and models; however, if no such special
protection is granted in that country, such works
shall be protected as artistic works."
Article 74 relates to the term ofprotection and provides
that:
"It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries
of the Union to determine the term of protection of
photographic works and that ofworks of applied art
in so far as they are protected as artistic works;
however, this term shall last at least until the end of
a period of twenty-five years from the making of
such a work."
The effect is that states can determine the nature of the
protection they apply to applied art, but where copyright
protection is provided for, the term should be 25 years.
In addition, where copyright is used to protect applied
art, the exclusive rights of the copyright owner can be
subject to limitations and exceptions. The Berne
Convention provides for a three step test for limitations
and exceptions, although only in relation to the
reproduction right. It provides that20:
"It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries
of the Union to permit the reproduction of such
works in certain special cases, provided that such
reproduction does not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the author."
The Berne Convention thus provides considerable
flexibility for member states as to how and to what extent
designs are protected. The Berne Convention does not
impose a harmonised framework, or prescribe clear rules
for designs to the extent that it does for many other
categories ofwork required to be protected by copyright.
Paris Convenflon
Historically there have also been attempts to harmonise
the protection of industrial designs through the
multilateral agreement on the protection of industrial
property, the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property Paris Convention. The current
version of the Paris Convention expressly includes
"industrial designs" as within the scope of industrial
property; the subject of the convention.2' The language
in art.Squinquies was first adopted in 1958, as part of a
move to promote sui generis design laws after the efforts
to include designs in copyright law had achieved only
some success.22Article 5 quinquies relates specifically to
industrial designs and provides that: "Industrial designs
shall be protected in all the countries of the Union."
In addition, the Convention includes some provisions
of detail covering industrial designs along with patents
and trade marks.23 However, while the Convention
imposes a requirement for the protection of industrial
designs, it does not specify the manner or form or
conditions for that protection, although it does provide
for some specific requirements.
Hague Agreement
The Hague Agreement Concerning the International
Registration of Industrial Designs Hague Agreement
also evidences an international effort to internationalise
sui generis design protection, by facilitating international
applications. The Hague Agreement is constituted by
three Acts: 1934, 1960 and 1999. The Hague Agreement
offers the possibility of obtaining protection for an
industrial design in several different states that are parties
to the Convention, by means of filing a single
international application.24 The Hague Agreement does
not, however, constitute an agreement on substance or
form of design protection in each state party.
20 Beme Convention, art.92. Article 13 of the TRIPS agreement uses similar language, but refers to the exclusive rights more broadly, not just to the reproduction right.
It provides that: "Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work
and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder".
21 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 12.
22Reichman, "Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law" 1983 Duke L.J. 1143, 1162-1163.
23Exples are the provisions relating to priority in Paris Convention, art.4, and the provisions relating to failure to work in art.5.
24 Intellectual Property Organisation, Guide to the International Registration ofDesigns, http://www.wipo. int/export/sites/www/hague/en/guide/pdf/hague_guide
part_o.pdj[Accessed August 2, 2008].
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In summary, the combined effect of industrial designs
provisions in the Berne and Paris Conventions is an
absence of clarity on industrial design protection. The
Paris Conventions, combined with the Hague Agreement,
envisages an international system of sui generis design
protection. The Berne Convention however provides for
copyright protection for applied art, without any definition
of what does and, perhaps more importantly, does not,
constitute applied art for this purpose. There is also the
provision in art.27 that it shall be a matter for states
legislation to determine the extent of the application of
their laws to works of applied art and industrial designs
and models, as well as the conditions under which such
works, designs and models shall be protected, but with
no definition of designs and models in this context, and
no clarification as to the difference between designs and
models and works of applied art.
TRIPS Agreement 1994
The TRIPS Agreement of 1994 is the most significant
multilateral instrument containing provisions relating to
the protection of industrial designs. The TRIPS
Agreement was negotiated in the 1986-94 Uruguay
Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GATT, in which the World Trade Organisation was
established. The TRIPS Agreement constitutes Annex
1C of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organisation WTO, and all members of the WTO are
therefore signatories to the TRIPS Agreement. The TRIPS
Agreement introduced intellectual property rules into the
multilateral trading system for the first time, and it
constitutes a comprehensive multilateral agreement on
intellectual property protection, setting out minimum
standards of protection as a requirement of all WTO
members.
The objectives of the TRIPS Agreement are set out in
art.7:
"Objectives
The protection and enforcement of intellectual
property rights should contribute to the promotion
of technological innovation and to the transfer and
dissemination oftechnology, to the mutual advantage
of producers and users of technological knowledge
and in a manner conducive to social and economic
welfare, and to a balance ofrights and obligations."
The TRIPS Agreement goes considerably further in
harmonising design law and industrial property law more
generally than did the earlier multilateral instruments.
TRIPS is more prescriptive than the Beme and Paris
Convention provisions, and it removes some of the
flexibility available under those regimes. However, the
TRIPS Agreement cannot be said to have achieved
harmonisation of designs law. WTO Member States still
have considerable freedom within the constraints imposed,
and there is still some ambiguity in the requirements. The
TRIPS Agreement requires that members comply with
the relevant provisions ofthe Berne Convention,25 and its
industrial design provisions are also compatible with the
relevant Paris Convention provisions. The TRIPS
Agreement has two specific sections in s.4 relating to
Industrial Designs. First, art.25 provides that:
"Requirements for Protection
Members shall provide for the protection
ofindependently created industrial designs
that are new or original. Members may
provide that designs are not new or original
if they do not significantly differ from
known designs or combinations of known
design features. Members may provide that
such protection shall not extend to designs
dictated essentially by technical or
functional considerations.
2. Each Member shall ensure that
requirements for securing protection for
textile designs, in particular in regard to
any cost, examination or publication, do
not unreasonably impair the opportunity to
seek and obtain such protection. Members
shall be free to meet this obligation through
industrial design law or through copyright
law."
In addition, art.26 provides that:
"Protection
The owner of a protected industrial design
shall have the right to prevent third parties
not having the owner's consent from
making, selling or importing articles
bearing or embodying a design which is a
copy, or substantially a copy, of the
protected design, when such acts are
undertaken for commercial purposes.
2. Members may provide limited exceptions
to the protection of industrial designs,
provided that such exceptions do not
unreasonably conflict with the normal
exploitation ofprotected industrial designs
and do not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the owner of the
protected design, taking account of the
legitimate interests of third parties.
3. The duration of protection available shall
amount to at least 10 years."
These articles carry substantial uncertainty and ambiguity.
Perhaps most fundamentally, there is no definition of the
term "industrial designs", and no attempt to provide
guidelines as to what the concept of industrial design
encompasses for TRIPS purposes. There is no guidance
as to how industrial designs relate to works of applied
art. "Industrial design" can be read broadly to encompass
25TRIPS Agreement art.9 requires that members comply with arts 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention 1971 and the Appendix thereto, but excluding art .6bis.
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all types of aesthetic designs, including those that are
functional and/or useful, and including traditional and
indigenous designs.26 No distinction is made between
designs protected by different regimes.
Article 25 requires that member states protect industrial
designs. It says that members shall provide for the
protection of independently created industrial designs
that are new or original. The provision combines concepts
of artistic and industrial property.27 There is an issue as
to the meaning of "independently created", which is not
defined. It is arguable that the reference to "independently
created" means that a work will be protected if it is
created by the author independently that is, not copied,
even if it is similar to another protected design.28 This has
echoes of copyright protection. Alternatively, it might be
argued that "independently created" requires some
minimal level of creativity, and is closer to an originality
requirement. However, art.25 also says that for designs
to be protected they must also be "new or original", in
addition to being independently created, suggesting that
"independently created" means something other than
original, and that "original" is actually a higher threshold
than "independently created", which is probably intended
to mean simply that a work is not copied. However, both
meanings are arguable, and member states may choose
to enact legislation based on either meaning.29
Article 25 also contains industrial property elements,
for example in the requirement that for designs to be
protected they must also be "new or original". Copyright
protection does not require that a work be "new". Novelty
is a requirement for industrial property protection, patent
protection being the obvious example. Novelty is usually
assessed at the date at which an application for protection
is filed.30 A novelty requirement does not seem on its face
to be compatible with the reference to independent
creation. However, the art.25 reference is to "new or
original", so that a design that is not new may be protected
if it is original.3' The issue then arises as to the meaning
of originality in this context, and what it adds over and
above the requirement for independent creation. In
copyright law, originality generally refers to originating
from the author, which is not significantly different from
independent creation. Originality in copyright law is also
understood as requiring a low level of skill and
labour-generally a level that is more than minimal.32
There are debates internationally about the standard of
originality, but general acceptance that the standard is
low.33
Article 251 also provides that Member States:
"[M]ay provide that designs are not new or original
if they do not significantly differ from known
designs or combinations ofknown design features."
This provision is consistent with the industrial property
approach that requires a high standard of novelty, so that
a design that does not significantly differ from known
designs or combinations of known design features might
be said not to be novel. This approach to novelty is
"objective" in the sense that novelty is assessed with
reference to a prior art base. However, this is not the
approach to originality in copyright law, and if Member
States do choose to provide as suggested this provision
is a suggestion, it is not mandatory, then they will not
be using the term original in a copyright law sense. The
other issue this provision raises is the meaning of"known
designs or combinations of known design features". It is
for Member States to decide what constitutes "known"
in this context, in particular whether this is a local novelty
or absolute novelty standard,34 and whether there are time
limitations on what constitutes prior art.35 Members are
also free to choose whether to implement grace periods,
as permitted under the Paris Convention.36
The final sentence in art.25l ofthe TRIPS Agreement
provides that:
"Members may provide that such protection shall
not extend to designs dictated essentially by
technical or functional considerations."
Arguably the most important aspect of this provision is
that it is not mandatory, it provides only that members
may provide. This wording reflects the divergent views
among the parties in relation to protection of functional
aspects of designs.37 There remain considerable variations
in practice across jurisdictions on this aspect ofprotection.
There are issues about the relationship between functional
designs and patent law. There can also be practical
difficulties in distinguishing functional features from
other features of a design.
Article 252 refers specifically to textiles. It provides
that:
"Each member shall ensure that requirements for
securing protection for textile designs, in particular
in regard to any cost, examination or publication,
do not unreasonably impair the opportunity to seek
261JNCTADICTSD Resource Book on TRIPS and Dove!opment 2005, 329.27 See discussion on this in Nuno Pires de Carvaiho, The TRIPS Regime of Trademarks and Designs Kiuwer Law International, 2006, pp.395-4ll.
28IJNCTAD4CTSD Resource Book on TRIPS andDevelopment 2005, 331.
29See discussion in UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development 2005, 331-332.
30 For example under the New Zealand Designs Act 1953 novelty is assessed at date of application, Designs Act 1953 NZ, s.5.` There was some disagreement between parties during the drafting of the provision on this question. Some members argued for the wording "new and original". See
detailed discussion of competing drafts in UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS andDevelopment 2005, 326-330. See also Pires de Carvalho, The TRIPS Regime
of Trademarks ondDesigns, 2006, pp.397-399.
See the House of Lords decision in Ladbroke Football Ltd v William Hill Football Ltd [1 964J 1 WL.R, 273.
under the arguably more rigorous approach to originality taken by the United States Supreme Court in Feist Publications Inc. v Rural Telephone Service Co. ,499
U.S. 340 1991, it was still acknowledged that the standard was low, and that few works would fail." In New Zealand, a local novelty test is still applied under the Designs Act 1953 NZ.
See discussion in Pires de Carvalho, The TRIPS Regime ofTrademark.s andDesigns, 2006, pp.400-402.
36Paris Convention, art.ll.
37Pires de Carvaiho, The TRIPS Regime ofTrademarks and Designs, 2006, p.402.
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and obtain such protection. Members shall be free
to meet this obligation through industrial design law
or through copyright law."
This provision was inserted in response to arguments that
fashion and textile designs had a short commercial life,
and needed to acquire protection quickly in order for that
protection to be effective.38 Developing countries also
expressed concern about the cost ofregistration acting as
a barrier to the protection of textiles from those
countries.39 The provision relates primarily to the
industrial property approach to protection, as copyright
protection does not require registration and associated
formalities. Indeed, compliance with the provision is
significantly simplified where copyright protection is
automatically available.40 In jurisdictions where copyright
protection is not available, and only sui generis registered
design protection is available, the obligation is to comply
with art.252. Some jurisdictions, for example New
Zealand and the United States, protect textile designs
through copyright. However there are difficulties where
the textile is used in utilitarian products, such as clothing,
which may then not be protected, for example in the
United States.4'
In summary, art.25l requires that members protect
designs, so long as they are:
i independently created; and
ii new or original.
Member States are limited by these requirements, in that
if a design is independently created and new or original,
then it must receive legal protection. Member States
cannot add additional requirements to raise the bar for
protection, unless these can be achieved consistently with
the provision.42 No definitions of the terms used are
provided. The sentences relating to similarity to known
designs, and to technical or functional considerations are
not mandatory requirements on members, they are
optional.
The provision does not specify whether protection is
to be through copyright as an artistic property regime, or
through sui generis design protection or other industrial
property regime. Member states are free to choose
whether to protect through copyright or thorough a sui
generis system requiring registration, or through copyright
or unregistered design right. Article 27 of the Berne
Convention allows Member States to determine the extent
of the application of their laws to works of applied art
and industrial designs and models, as well as the
conditions under which such works, designs and models
shall be protected. It is therefore open to states to exclude
all works of applied art and industrial designs and models
from copyright protection, and provide sui generis design
protection only. It is also open to member states to
practice cumulation, and offer dual concurrent protection
via both copyright and sui generis system, so that design
owners can choose to use either or both. Partial
cumulation, where copyright is available only for
exceptionally creative designs, is also an option.43 At a
practical level, the type ofprotection provided does make
a difference. Copyright, for example, protects against
copying, but not against independent creation.
Unregistered design rights are generally similar. By
contrast, sui generis regimes based on registration protect
against both copying and independent creation ofa similar
design, and patent and utility model protection also
provide this stronger protection. Systems of cumulation
or partial cumulation will provide a mix of these
approaches to protection, with some designs receiving
one or the other, and some eligible for both, depending
on the rules in the specific jurisdiction.
Article 26 has a different focus from art.25. Article 26
focuses not on which designs should be protected, but on
what protection should constitute. Article 261 provides
that a proprietor ofa protected industrial design shall have
the right to prevent third parties from making, selling or
importing for commercial purposes articles bearing or
embodying a design which is a copy, or substantially a
copy, of the protected design. This provision covers
concepts of protection in both industrial property and
copyright approaches.
Article 262 allows Member States to provide limited
exceptions to the protection of industrial designs,
"provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably
conflict with the normal exploitation of protected
industrial designs and do not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the owner of the protected design,
taking account ofthe legitimate interests ofthird parties".
This language directly echoes the language used in
relation to limitations and exceptions to copyright
protection in the Beme Convention "the three-step test".
Article 263 provides for a minimum term of design
protection of 10 years. This applies to industrial property
style protection, as copyright protection for designs is
required to last at least 25 years under art.74 of the
Berne Convention. It is arguable that where states offer
both sui generis design protection and copyright
protection, then the term under the sui generis regime
may be less than ten years as the obligation to provide at
least ten years is met by the provision of copyright
protection.44
The TRIPS agreement is non-specific as to ownership
ofrights, so that states have some flexibility as to the law
they apply in relation to ownership of rights by natural
Pires de Carvaiho, The TRIPS Regime of Trademarks and Designs, 2006, pp.406-409.
Matthews, Globalising Intellectual Properly Rights: the TRIPS Agreement Routledge, 2002, 57.
See discussion in TJNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development 2005 335-336.
Pires de Carvaiho, The TRIPS Regime ofTrademarks and Designs, 2006, pp.41 0-411
- Examples are discussed in Fires de Carvalho, The TRIPS Regime of Trademarks and Designs, 2006, pp.403-404. States may for example have an additional requirement
of compliance with public order and morality.
See discussion in Reichman, "Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law" 1983 Duke U. 1143, 1168-1170.
See discussion in IJNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development 2005, 341-342.
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and legal persons, so long as other requirements are met.45
The TRIPS Agreement also does not require provision
of moral rights as provided for in art,6bis of the Berne
Convention,46 and it does not require provision of resale
rights droll de suite for artworks.
The TRIPS Agreement and Berne and
Paräs Conventions compared
There are important differences between the protection
of designs required under the TRIPS Agreement, and the
designs protection formerly required under the Berne and
Paris Conventions.
First, the TRIPS Agreement moves beyond the Beme
and Paris Agreements in that it requires a minimum level
ofprotection for a least some industrial designs, although
it does still permit considerable flexibilities in achieving
that protection. The term "flexibilities" is used in a
number of senses in regards to TRIPS, but it is used here
broadly to refer to those aspects ofthe TRIPS Agreement
that allow Member States freedom to exercise their own
decision-making processes in choosing between a number
ofpossible policy options.47 WTO members are generally
free to adopt any legal or policy approaches in relation
to areas of intellectual property that are not expressly
harmonised in the TRIPS Agreement.48 In relation to
designs law, there are some flexibilities in the substantive
legal protection required, and very substantial flexibilities
in the means and processes for achieving that protection.
Members are also explicitly granted the flexibility to
implement in their law more extensive protection than is
required by the Agreement, by operation of art.ll.
Secondly, the TRIPS Agreement differs from the Berne
and Paris Conventions in respect of national treatment.
The TRIPS Agreement contains a provision for national
treatment.49 The Beme Convention and Paris Convention
have similar provisions.50 However, the TRIPS national
treatment provision is worded differently. The Berne and
Paris Conventions provide that nationals ofother Member
States shall receive the same protection as their own
nationals. Article 3 ofthe TRIPS Agreement requires that
each member shall accord to nationals of other members'
treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its
own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual
property.5' This difference is not insignificant. The TRIPS
Agreement provides for minimum standards. This means
that, under TRIPS, even if a Member State does not
protect the intellectual property rights of its own nationals,
it still must protect the rights of nationals of other
members up to the level required by the TRIPS
obligations.52 Ifthe Member State provides a higher level
of protection for its own nationals, nationals of other
Member States must also receive treatment no less
favourable.
The TRIPS Agreement also contains a
most-favoured-nation clause, a novelty in an international
intellectual property agreement.53Article 4 provides that54:
"With regard to the protection of intellectual
property, any advantage, favour, privilege or
immunity granted by a Member to the nationals of
any other country shall be accorded immediately
and unconditionally to the nationals of all other
members ..."
This means that if a WTO member grants more favourable
treatment to nationals of any other country, then that level
of treatment must immediately and unconditionally be
granted to the nationals of other Member States.
Typically, this situation would arise where a bilateral
agreement provided for more favourable treatment for
nationals of the parties to that agreement, and that
treatment would then have to be extended to nationals of
all members of the WTO.
A third difference is that the TRIPS Agreement also
contains provisions relating to enforcement of intellectual
property rights55 and to dispute resolution and settlement.56
The dispute resolution and settlement provisions are
particularly significant, as the WTO dispute resolution
procedures are applied under TRIPS to intellectual
property disputes. There was previously no such
international dispute resolution structure for intellectual
property disputes. Neither the Berne Convention nor the
Paris Convention established any kind of equivalent
framework.
Summary
In summary, the combined effect of Berne, Paris and
TRIPS is that designs law is still uncertain. International
intellectual property law does not prescribe very much
about design protection. There are clearly divergent
philosophies and approaches being practiced across
jurisdictions, and attempts at harmonisation have not been
particularly successful. International agreements do
impose requirements for design protection, and there are
enforcement and dispute resolution procedures. However,
See discussion in UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development 2005, 343.
46T Agreement, art.9l
See discussion in Pires de Carvalho, The TRIPS Regime ofTrademarks and Designs, 2006, pp.28-33.48 was confirmed by the decision of the Appellate Body in the India-US Mailbox Dispute, WT/DS5O/AB/R, see hitp://wwwwto.org/english/traiope/dispu_e/cases_e
/ds5O_e.htm [Accessed August 11, 2008] and see also Matthews, Globalising Intellectual Property Rights: the TRIPS Agreement, 2002, 135.
Article 3 of the TRIPS Agreement requires that each member shall accord to nationals of other members' treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own
nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property.
50Beme Convention, art.5, Paris Convention, art.2.
Footnote 3 of the TRIPS Agreement provides that: "For the purposes of Articles 3 and 4, `protection' shall include matters affecting the availability, acquisition, scope,
maintenance and enforcement ofintellectual property rights as well as those matters affecting the use of intellectual property rights specifically addressed in this Agreement."
Pires de Carvalho, The TRIPS Regime ofTrademarks and Designs, 2006, p.1 12.` See http:/A wto.org/english/docse/legale/ursume.htm#nAgreemeni [Accessed August 11, 2008].
54Article 4 goes on to provide for limited specific exemptions.
55TRIPS Agreement Part UI.
56TRIPS Agreement Part V.
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there is considerable flexibility as to the subject matter,
nature and scope ofrequired protection, and states remain
free to choose design law from a smorgasbord of options.
There is no requirement on states to operate a
comprehensive regime for registered design protection,
and there are not clear rules as to the provision of
copyright protection for designs. Perhaps most
significantly, cumulation and partial cumulation remain
as options, and the problems associated with overlap
between copyright and sui generis protection have not
been resolved at an international level.57 As a
consequence, countries are free to offer generous levels
of copyright protection to works of applied art, with the
result that designers may prefer this to sui generis design
protection, even when it is available, and sui generis
design law can come to be seen as little more than an
optional extra on top of copyright protection. There is
also scope for countries to exclude most works of applied
art from copyright protection, and such an exclusion can
be achieved in a variety of ways, using a variety of
statutory formulations. Where this is done, sui generis
design protection becomes more important to designers.
If the requirements of sui generis design protection are
rigorous, some designs will actually remain unprotected,
or be left to rely only on trade mark protection where this
is available.
In globalised markets, there has been increasing
pressure for harmonisation of intellectual property law
generally, and this effort has established minimum
standards of protection in most areas and considerable
harmonisation. While there has been some agreement on
designs law, it is an area in which there remains very
diverse practice.
To what extent is this lack ofharmonisation a problem?
In international trade, designers and manufacturers are
dealing with very different and technically complex
regimes across jurisdictions, leading to increased
transaction costs. The same design will receive different
protection in differentjurisdictions, so that in some cases
copying will be permitted in some jurisdictions and not
in others, and trade marks will assume greater importance
in some jurisdictions. It is therefore arguable that
simplification and harmonisation are desirable goals, at
least across developedjurisdictions. The next section will
consider the arguments for and against harmonisation of
designs law.
II. International Harmonisation of Designs
Law: the Case for Diversity
As the discussion in the preceding section demonstrates,
designs law is the least harmonised of the intellectual
property regimes. At the international level, there is no
multilateral agreement that prescribes in detail either the
level of design protection or the nature ofthe regimes by
which designs are to be protected. The TRIPS Agreement
does require that members shall provide for the protection
of independently created industrial designs that are new
or original, but within this, WTO members retain very
considerable flexibility.
There remains very substantial variation in the
approaches to design protection across jurisdictions. In
a globalised marketplace, it is arguable that harmonisation
is a desirable goal, for three principal reasons. First,
proponents of harmonisation would argue that
harmonisation of intellectual property rights promotes
investment and technology transfer. Harmonisation
reduces transaction costs in international trade, as
products receive similar protection across jurisdictions.
Inventors, authors and other rights-holders, along with
investors, then have some certainty about levels of
protection, and the costs associated with obtaining
protection in new markets are reduced. 58 Of course, for
designs, this argument depends on harmonisation of
protection actually involving the provision of protection
for designs-in effect harmonisation upwards in terms
of levels of protection. Once protection is offered, the
argument goes, rights-holders will transfer their
technology to new jurisdictions and there will be an
in-flow of foreign direct investment.59
A second argument for harmonisation is that
harmonisation of protection to a uniform level prevents
free-riding by countries offering lesser protection. This
means that countries in which technology is developed
and protected by intellectual property laws generally
first world nations can prevent wholesale copying ofthat
technology in jurisdictions where intellectual property
receives lesser protection. Inventors and creators, and the
countries providing the infrastructure for that invention
and creativity, are therefore able to recoup their
investment and be protected from free-riders. It is also
arguable that harmonisation discourages protectionism
and facilitates trade. For designs, this means that if
designs law was harmonised upwards, designs, for
example fashion designs, could not then be produced in
one jurisdiction and then copied and sold elsewhere at a
much cheaper price.
A third argument for harmonisation is that it can
facilitate the administration of the intellectual property
regimes, with consequent reduced costs. For designs, this
could mean co-operation between jurisdictions within a
region or internationally in examining and granting design
registration applications.
The late 20th and early 21st century saw major
initiatives toward harmonisation, based on the idea that
harmonisation was desirable for international trade. The
high point of this effort was the TRIPS Agreement of
1994, which established a minimum level of intellectual
property protection in WTO Member States, and the
signing ofwhich was a prerequisite to membership ofthe
See discussion in Reichman, "Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law" 1983 Duke L.J. 1143, 1167-1170.
See discussion in Peter K. Yu, "Five Disharmonizing Trends in the International Intellectual Property Regime", Michigan State University College ofLaw Legal Studies
Research Paper Series Research Paper No.03-28, 2006, 6-7, available at htlp://ssrn. corn/abstract=923 177 [Accessed May 17, 2010].
See discussion in Daniel J. Gervais, "Intellectual Property, Trade and Development: The State of Play" 2005 74 Ford/sam Law Review 505, 516-519.
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WTO. The World Intellectual Property Organisation
WIPO Internet Treaties of 1996, covering copyright
and performers rights,66 were also efforts at globalising
and harmonising rights. There have also been regional
efforts at harmonisation, most notably within the
European Community.61 Frequently, where rights have
been harmonised, they have been harmonised upwards
based on the regimes in developed economies. This trend
toward upward harmonisation has also been evident when
harmonisation has been between developed countries, for
example in harmonising the term ofcopyright protection.62
There are powerful arguments for harmonisation, and
there is little doubt that harmonisation has real benefits.
However, there is also a growing concern internationally
about the effects of harmonisation, and a growing
literature questioning whether harmonisation of
intellectual property is always a desirable goal.63
Increasingly, there is evidence to support the argument
that harmonisation of intellectual property rights is not
necessarily to be preferred over diversification of rights.64
These concerns apply at least as much to designs as to
other categories of intellectual property.
The first argument against harmonisation is the
argument that the same level ofprotection does not fit all
economies at all levels of development.65 In part, this
argument is based on concerns about harmonisation to
the level of the minimum standards for intellectual
property required under TRIPS.66 Since its signing in
1994, there has been considerable criticism ofthe TRIPS
Agreement, especially with respect to its effects on
developing countries.67 It is argued that harmonisation of
intellectual property rights to a level based on developed
economies is not in the interests of developing countries
or in the interests ofdevelopment more generally. TRIPS
established a global regime that required developing
countries to put in place new intellectual property rights
protection and enforcement systems,68 a task both
administratively difficult and involving economic
dislocation. The provisions focused on protecting new
technologies, which were the concern of the highly
industrialised nations, but undervalued existing and
traditional knowledge.69 This is important for designs, as
designs are regularly produced in developing countries,
and designs are an important component of traditional
knowledge. Fabric designs are an obvious example, as
are weavings and carvings. Hand-made designs are
common even in the poorest of economies. However, the
establishment of harmonised rules for the protection of
designs was not a priority in TRIPS, and designs law
remains possibly the least harmonised of all intellectual
property regimes.
Developing and less-industrialised countries accepted
TRIPS in return for improved access for agricultural
goods to markets in the highly industrialised countries,
particularly the United States and Europe.7° The prevailing
view at the time TRIPS was signed was that establishing
intellectual property rights regimes in developing
countries would encourage technology transfer from
developed to developing countries,7' and would mean
developing countries were attractive to foreign investment
in local infrastructure and human capital, thereby
promoting economic growth and development.72 However,
this has not been the reality, and the economic and social
costs of TRIPS have been high in the developing world.
Evidence of the effects of TRIPS now suggests that
development may in some cases be hindered rather than
assisted by high levels of intellectual property protection.73
In addition, intellectual property rights and public health,
Copyright Treaty 1996 and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 1996.
61 European Community offers the most effective model for design harmonisation, but even Europe, with its internal market and considerable experience ofharmonisation
of Community laws, is very far from operating an entirely harmonised system of design protection. Registered design law is substantively harmonised, but procedures are
not. Parallel systems are in operation, and copyright and unregistered design protection systems remain diverse. In addition, member states are free to also protect designs
through patents, utility models, trade mark law, and unfair competition law.
62Harmonjsation of the term of copyright protection, first within the European Union and then between the European Union and the United States involved harmonising
upward to life of the author plus seventy years, which was the term in Germany, and the longest term used in any of the relevant nations.
See for example Keith Maskus and Jerome Reichman, "The Globalisation of Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods" 2004 7 Journal
ofInternational Economic Law 279, David Vaver, "Need Intellectual Property be Everywhere? Against Ubiquity and Uniformity" 2002 25 Dalhousie L.J. 1, Margaret
Chon, "Intellectual Property and the Development Divide" [2006] 276 Cardozo Law Review 2813, James Boyle, The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons ofthe Mind
Yale University Press, 2008.
4See discussion in Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights andDevelopment Policy: Report ofthe Commission an Intellectual
Property Rights, London, September 2002, and Vaver, "Need Intellectual Property Be Everywhere? Against Ubiquity and Uniformity" 2002 25 Dalhousie L.J. I.
65YU "Five Disharmonizing Trends in the International Intellectual Property Regime", Michigan State University College ofLaw Legal Studies Research Paper Series
Research Paper No. 03-28, 2006, 6-7, available at http://ssrn. com/abstract-923177 [Accessed May 17, 20101.66 first argument as made here is also made in Anna Kingsbury, `Intellectual Property Provisions in Bilateral and Regional Free Trade Agreements' 2004 10 New
Zealand Business Law Quarterly, 222, 223-225.
67 See for example "WTO Intellectual Property Rights for Corporations Threaten Food Security and Access to Medicines" in L Wallach and M Sforza, Whose Trade
Organisaiion? Corporate Globalization and the Erosion ofDemocracy1999, L.T.C. Harms, "Offering Cake for the South" [2000] E.I.P.R. 451.
Transitional Arrangements in Part VI of TRIPS permitted developing countries to delay applying the provisions for four years art.65, and least-developed countries
could delay for ten years art.66. Under art,66 I the ten year period is extendable by the Council for TRIPS.
discussion in Frederick M. Abbott, "TRIPS in Seattle: The Not-So-Surprising Failure and future of the TRIPS Agenda" 2000 18 Berkeley Journal ofInternational
Law 165,
7tHowever, while TRIPS requirements have been onerous for many developing countries, and even for relatively developed countries like New Zealand, there has been
little subsequent movement in opening markets for agricultural goods in retum. This concern was a major factor in the breakdown of WTO Doha Round talks in Cancun
in 2003. See Christopher May, "Why IPRs are a Global Political Issue" [2003] E.I.P.R. 1, 4.
Article 662 of TRIPS requires developed countries to provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories to promote and encourage technology transfer
to least developed countries. In February 2003, at the request of the least developed countries, the TRIPS Council put in place reporting requirements on developed countries
in an effort to make this more effective. See http://docs online, win. org/DDFDocuments/t/IP/C/28.doc [Accessed May 17, 2010]. Article 16 of the Rio Convention on
Biological Diversity 1992 also made explicit provision for access to and transfer of technology to developing countries.
72 See discussion in Daniel J. Gervais, "Intellectual Property, Trade and Development: The State of Play" 2005 74 Fordham Law Review 505, 507-511.
73See for example Evelyn Su, "The Winners and the Losers: The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and its Effect on Developing Countries"
200023 Hous. J. Int'L L 169.
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and the problems of access to patented medicines for
people outside of developed countries, has become a
major issue in TRIPS fora over the last decade.74
The relationship between intellectual property
protection and economic growth and development is at
best uncertain. For each country there exists an array of
factors that influence development, and the effects of
each factor will depend on the economic and social
situation in each country.75 Generally intellectual property
rights are administratively costly as they require
establishment of agencies and systems for examination,
registration and enforcement. They also reduce
employment in local manufacturing industries producing
counterfeit goods, such as pharmaceuticals and copyright
goods. The result is an urgent need for alternative
employment, and increasing reliance on imports.
Intellectual property rights also transfer rents from
developing to developed countries, to a significant
degree.76 Intellectual property rights can generate abuses
of market power, such as monopoly prices, especially
where competition laws are absent. Perhaps most
seriously, intellectual property rights reduce access to
cultural and creative works, with a potentially chilling
effect on the creation of future works, and on the ability
of states to increase levels of both cultural and technical
education in order to be globally competitive.77 Intellectual
property rights increase the cost of providing technical
and cultural education to local populations, making it
extremely difficult to reach a level of global
competitiveness allowing for the kind of domestic
innovation for which intellectual property rights are
designed as an incentive.78 In the development context,
it has been suggested that intellectual property protection
should be assessed not only by its impact on economic
growth, but also by distributional effects, and should
incorporate a substantive equality principle.79
Intellectual property protection becomes most desirable
as a tool for economic growth when countries reach a
high level ofcultural and industrial development.50 Indeed,
the industrialized states have increased their intellectual
property protection in parallel with increasing their
technological and cultural development. There is evidence
that providing intellectual property protection to
foreigners is also not in the interests of developing
countries.8' Although industrialised states, and especially
the United States, developed intellectual property law
only as they increased their technological and cultural
base, TRIPS does not generally permit developing
countries to now take this path to development. Instead,
developing countries are required to comply with TRIPS
minimum standards while also trying to develop their
creative industries and global competitiveness. There is
consequent suspicion of hannonisation as a goal,
especially among developing countries, and there is no
general consensus in support. Because of concerns about
impacts on development, and technology transfer, the
Least Developed Countries obtained a
seven-and-a-half-year extension of the transition period
for implementing TRIPS in 2005.82
A second argument against harmonisation is the
argument that it prevents legal experimentation, or
"laboratories of politics".83 Intellectual property is a
contentious area for law makers, even when the objectives
are agreed. There remain very real debates about how
best to promote innovation, and how best to balance
intellectual property rights against the need for
competition and subsequent innovation, and against
broader values such as free speech. There are strong
arguments that the public domain should be the default
position, and any derogation from it in the form of
intellectual property rights requires evidence-based
justification.54 Diversification in this context allows for
experimentation and competition between jurisdictions
in devising optimal or at least better policy solutions.
Widely different approaches to intellectual property
protection have existed in the past in different
jurisdictions. In an area where there is little empirical
evidence as to what actually succeeds in promoting
innovation, this diversity not only permits states to
structure intellectual property protection as they think
appropriate, but it can also actually provide useful
evidence. Rarmonisation prevents this kind of
experimental policy-making.
A third argument against harmonisation by
international agreement is based more broadly on concepts
of local democracy, and the idea that local communities
should have some input into devising policies appropriate
documents and discussion at http://www wto. org/english/tratope/trips_e/pharmpatent_e,htm [Accessed May 17, 201 0].
See for example Keith Maskus, "Intellectual Property Challenges for Developing Countries: An Economic Perspective" 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 457.
Maskus estimated the impact of stronger patent rights resulting from TRIPS over 29 countries, in 1995 United States dollars, and found that overwhelmingly the United
States would gain the most income through such rent transfers, with a net inflow of US$5.8 billion per year. Most countries would experience a net outflow of patent rents.
Maskus, "Intellectual Property Challenges for Developing Countries" 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 457, 468.
77See discussion in Rochelle Dreyfuss, "TRIPS Round II: Should Users Strike Back?" 2004 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 21, 22.
75Dreyfuss, "TRIPS Round II" 200471 U. Chi. L. Rev. 21,29.
See Margaret Chon, "Intellectual Property and the Development Divide" 2006 276 Cardozo Law Review 2813.
50Ge,vais concluded that IP increased FDI and trade flows only for IP-sensitive goods, and for countries above a certain economic development threshold, but that factors
such as the trade regime, tax and competition laws were also influential. See discussion in Gervais, "Intellectual Property, Trade and Development" 2005 74 Pordham
Law Review 505, 519.
The United States was slow to recognise intellectual property rights for foreign creators, doing so only when its own intellectual property industries were highly developed,
and in effect it built its cultural industries in part by permitting piracy of the works of foreign writers. See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates and the
Creation of American Literature" 1996-97 29 NYU J Intl L & Polit 255. The United States became a signatory to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works only in 1989, and the United States was also slow to recognise foreign activities in its patent law, in an effort to encourage importation of new techniques
into the country. See discussion in R. Merges and J. Duffy, Patent Law and Policy: Cases and Materials, 3rd cdii New York: LexisNexis, 2002, pp.513-533. See also
Susan K. Sell, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization ofIntellectual Property Rights Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp.64-65.
TRIPS Agreement, art.66 I, htip://wwwwto.org/english/news e/presO5 e/pr424..e.htm [Accessed May 17, 20101.
John Duffy, "Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law" 2002 17 Berkeley Tech L.J. 685, 706-708.
4Boyle, The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons ofthe Mind, New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2008.
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to that community.85 Such an argument may seem naïve
in a globalised world, but the inability of governments to
make their own decisions about what intellectual property
protection to provide is one significant basis for criticism
of TRIPS.
A fourth argument against harmonisation is the
argument that the intellectual property regimes as they
presently exist in developed countries are very far from
constituting ideal models.86 In the words of one
commentator87:
"As currently configured in the developed world, IP
is excessive. It needs trimming back. Ubiquity and
uniformity are not always virtues in law, and,
globalization notwithstanding, they are not virtues
for IP law, which in many respects is incoherent and
morally indefensible. If it were a product, it would
be declared unmerchantable and unfit for its purpose.
That is no testimonial for a law that the developed
world continues to impose on the developing world.
The tendency towards ubiquity and uniformity needs
to be reversed. A nation should, within broad limits,
be free to strike its own balance in its IP laws to suit
its own circumstances: fewer and more varied IP
laws should be considered virtues, not vices."
Today, global harmonisation of intellectual property
protection remains highly contentious internationally.
There is no international consensus supporting the levels
of protection required in the current regime, and no
agreement that intellectual property protection is always
beneficial to development. Since 1994, industrialised
states have not found support within the WTO for
increasing global levels ofintellectual property protection,
and the efforts of these states have therefore turned to
increasing intellectual property protection through the
provisions in bilateral and regional free trade agreements.
The United States has provided much of the impetus for
ratcheting up levels of intellectual property protection
through bilateral and regional trade agreements. This
trend to "TRIPS-Plus" protection, in which bilateral and
regional free trade agreements contain provisions
generally imposed by the developed countries for levels
ofprotection above the levels required by TRIPS, is itself
a trend against global harmonisation of intellectual
property rights.88 However, design protection has not been
a significant element in these processes, reflecting the
low level of domestic design protection in the United
States and a consequent lack of interest in ratcheting up
protection, as this is an area in which the United States
would have to increase its own levels of protection to
match its trading partners.
There is now no international agreement that "one size
fits all" in intellectual property protection, and
increasingly arguments are made against a single
globalised system of protection. The evidence does not
support the idea of a single optimal level of protection.89
It is argued that economies at different levels of
development should be free to enact intellectual property
regimes that are suited to their economic and geographic
situations. Each country should look at the costs and
benefits of levels and types of protection, in their own
unique situation. For developing countries, or countries
that are less highly industrialised, minimal compliance
with TRIPS is likely to be an appropriate policy choice.9°
Intellectual property regimes have always been flexible.
They have changed over time, and they have been subject
to variation both regionally and within jurisdictions. This
flexibility and variation has not been shown to discourage
innovation.9t Indeed, very considerable periods of
innovation occurred in periods when there was little or
no intellectual property protection, which may or may
not show any causal connection.
In the area of designs, the arguments against
harmonisation are particularly strong. Designs are
important in developing countries and as aspects of
traditional knowledge. They are also important as aspects
of modern industrial design and branding/product
differentiation. Countries at different levels of
development will wish to emphasise different values in
design protection. Even within developed economies,
there is very wide variation in the approaches to design
protection. The argument that there is no one size to fit
all is particularly strong for designs law.
Ill. Conclusion
Designs law is far from being harmonised to date, and,
while there are designs law provisions in the TRIPS
Agreement, very considerable flexibility remains. There
exists considerable diversity in approaches to design
protection internationally. The developed countries
themselves use a diverse range of models for protecting
designs, varying from the relatively low level of
protection and pro-competition approach taken by the
United States, to the more protectionist approach of the
United KingdomlEurope and Australia and to the very
high level of protection provided in countries such as
New Zealand.
Yu, "Five Disharmonizing Trends in the International Intellectual Property Regime", Michigan State University College ofLaw Legal Studies Research Paper Series
Research Paper No.03-28 2006, 6-7, available at http://ssrn.coin/abstraci=923] 77 [Accessed May 17, 2010], referring to Duffy, "Harmony and Diversity in Global PatentLaw" 2002 17 Berkeley Tech Li. 685, 706-707.
86See for example the detailed criticism ofthe intellectual property system in developed nations in Boyle, The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons ofthe Mind, 2008h11p://www.ihepublicdomain.org/ [Accessed May 17, 2010], and in Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and DevelopmentPolicy: Report ofthe Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, London, September 2002.
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There is little empirical evidence available as to the
success ofdifferent approaches to protection in promoting
innovation, and it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions
as to what would constitute an optimal model of
protection, if such a thing exists. Any model ofprotection
must interact with local economic and social conditions
and attitudes, and the trade situation of the state
concerned. Even within the developed world, these
conditions differ across countries, and the extent to which
protection or competition is valued also differs. In the
United States, designs have been largely unprotected by
intellectual property law for many years, and it is certainly
not clear that the designs industry has suffered.92
The absence of highly prescriptive international
agreements harmonising the law of designs means that
there is now an unusual level of freedom for each
jurisdiction to craft a designs law regime suited to its own
social and economic conditions and trade situation, within
the requirements of international law. In eachjurisdiction,
designs law can be developed according to prevailing
views about the relationships between pure and applied
art, and the uses of art in industrial settings.93 For
developing countries, the absence of harmonisation
beyond the TRIPS requirements means that there is an
opportunity to develop design protection appropriate to
the level of industrial development. Designs need not be
protected at a level that provides strong rights for
foreigners with consequent restrictions of local copying
of foreign technology and outfiowing royalties. In
addition, for both developed and developing countries,
there is some freedom to develop designs protection
appropriate to indigenous designs.
The absence of harmonisation is therefore a very real
benefit to the international community and to individual
states, at least in the short to medium term. Designs law
is and can usefully continue to be an example of
diversification rather than harmonisation in intellectual
property law.
92 There is now a strong lobby for protection of fashion designs as a kind of special case, but the evidence is not strong
that the provision of such protection would in fact
further promote innovation, and it is inevitable that it would impose further costs on consumers, see Raustiala and
Sprigman, "The Piracy Paradox" 2006 92 Virginia Law
Review 1687. l-lowever, the absence of legal protection for most designs in United States law has led to significant
pressure on trade mark law to effectively fill the gap.
This has happened to an extent in Europe, although the European Directive on the Legal Protection of Designs
Directive 98/7 1/EC, October 13, 1998 and the European
Council Regulation on Community Designs Regulation 6/2002 have required some harmonisation within Europe.
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